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Chapman: America's Least Funny Home Videos: A Critique of the Kephart v. S

AMERICA'S LEAST FUNNY HOME VIDEOS: A
CRITIQUE OF THE KEPHART V. STATE
AUTHENTICATION STANDARD FOR
VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow'
INTRODUcTION

Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901 requires authentication of
videotape evidence prior to its admission in a criminal trial.2 However, with recent technological advances, videotape may easily be altered. As a result, Texas courts have struggled to maintain uniform
authentication standards for admission of videotape evidence.
In Kephart v. State,3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held Rule
901 requires a sponsoring witness to testify that a videotape accurately
depicts what he observed or satisfaction of the Edwards test,4 which
requires testimony that the taping process used was accurate. 5 Under
Kephart, this standard applies when a third party records another's
criminal acts or records his own criminal acts on videotape. 6 However, with third-party videotapes, often no witness observed the depicted event or no witness is available to testify as to the accuracy of
the taping process.
The Kephart standard inferentially recognizes that authenticating
videotape evidence may prove problematic as videotapes may be easily manipulated.7 However, the Kephart standard is too stringent because it may require Texas courts to exclude a large class of relevant
videotape evidence despite its ability to be authenticated by indirect
means or through circumstantial evidence.
The Hollow Men, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN
1227 (Nina Baym et al. eds., 2d ed. 1985).
2. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901. See Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) (a predicate is required to establish the accuracy and reliability of videotape evidence).
3. 875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam).
4. See id. at 322.
5. See infra p. 73.
6. For purposes of this discussion, third-party videotapes will be defined as videotapes made by private individuals depicting the criminal acts of others. Additionally,
self-made videotapes will be defined as videotapes made by private individuals depicting their own criminal acts.
7. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 321-22.
1. T.S. ELIOT,
LITERATURE 1225,
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The Kephart court's analysis fails to consider many precedential and
logical factors. First, the Kephart court applied a Rule 901 illustration
as a limitation.8 Second, federal courts interpret Federal Rule of Evidence 901 as permitting authentication of videotape evidence by indirect means, such as through circumstantial evidence. 9 Since Texas
Rule of Evidence 901 is a direct replication of Federal Rule of Evidence 901, it should be similarly interpreted."° Third, the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals holds circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate audio recordings. 1 Since combining video pictures with
audio recordings provides a greater indicia of reliability than do audio
recordings alone, 2it is not logical to create a more stringent standard
for videotape evidence.
Fourth, the Kephart court's holding is based upon two common theories of photographic authentication, the pictorial testimony theory
and the silent witness theory.'3 However, these theories typically apply to videotape evidence recorded by police or private business surveillance.' 4 These authentication theories were not developed in
relation to third-party or self-made videotape evidence, and thus,
should not be used to exclude such evidence merely because it fails to
fit these evidentiary categories.
This note will analyze the evidentiary standard for third-party or
self-made videotapes promulgated by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals in Kephart, discuss evidentiary standards applied to similar
8. See id. at 321.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (videotapes may be authenticated by means other than those required under the pictorial
testimony or silent witness theory standards for admissibility); United States v.
Steams, 550 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding circumstantial or indirect evidence may be used to authenticate photographs).
10. See Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc) (stating the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence are based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Texas courts should be guided by federal interpretations as to scope and
applicability of the rules unless the Texas rule clearly departs from the federal rule);
Harris v. State, 846 S.W.2d 960, 964 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd)
("The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence are patterned after the Federal Rules of
Evidence," and thus the federal rules should be consulted for guidance in
interpretations).
11. See Wallace v. State, 782 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc)
("[T]he predicate for admission of audio tapes may be proven with circumstantial
evidence").
12. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322 ("'[Because of the dual aspect of videotapes
they convey a greater indicia of reliability than either film or sound tapes standing
alone .

. . ."'

Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322 (quoting Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645, 649

(Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). See Lucas v. State, 791 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(holding because "videotapes are motion pictures as well as sound recordings.., they
convey a greater sense of reliability than either film or sound tapes standing along.").
13. See HULEN D. WENDORF ET AL., TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL, IX-8

to IX-9 (4th ed. 1995); Benjamin V. Madison III, Note, Seeing Can Be Deceiving:
PhotographicEvidence in a Visual Age-How Much Weight Does It Deserve?, 25 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 705, 709 (1984).
14. See infra Part III.C.
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types of evidence by other courts, and demonstrate that third-party or
self-made videotape evidence requires a different authentication standard than does videotape evidence recorded under police or private
business surveillance.
I.

AUTHENTICATION AND ADMISSIBILITY OF RECORDED EVIDENCE
IN TEXAS

Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901(a), a word for word adoption
of Federal Rule of Evidence 901, states, "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims."'1 5 However, prior to the adoption of Rule 901,16 Texas courts applied a seven-prong test established
in Edwards v. State'7 to determine the admissibility of evidence recorded by law enforcement agencies.' 8
In Edwards, the defendant appealed his conviction for barratry, asserting that the trial court erred in allowing an audio tape into evidence because it was not sufficiently authenticated. 19 In denying the
defendant's appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted a
seven-step test for authentication of audio recordings:
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking
testimony,
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent,
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the
recording,
(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been
made,
(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording,
(6) identification of the speakers, and
(7) a showing that the testimony
20 elicited was voluntarily made
without any kind of inducement.
This test subsequently provided the basis for authentication of other
types of recorded evidence, including videotape evidence. 2 '
15. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(a).
16. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at xxvi. (The Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence

became effective on September 1, 1986).
17. 551 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
18. See, e.g., Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Shephard
v. State, 749 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, pet. ref'd).
19. See Edwards, 551 S.W.2d at 732-33.
20. Id. at 733 (quoting Cummings v. Jess Edwards, Inc., 445 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Corpus Christi 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also WENDORF, supra note 13, at
IX-10 to -12.

21. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at IX-12. See, e.g., Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645,
649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Shepard v. State, 749 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, pet. ref'd); Sims v. State, 735 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987,

pet. ref d).
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In 1986, Texas adopted the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence,
which were modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence and were
designed to bring predictability and consistency to the law of evidence.22 Notably, in Stapleton v. State,23 the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals concluded that Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901 substantially incorporated the Edwards authentication test.24 Further, the
Kephart court stated that Texas courts continue to utilize pre-rules
case law interpreting the Edwards authenticity requirements to guide
evidentiary determinations under Rule 901.25
In applying Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901 to recorded photographic evidence,26 two basic theories underlie authentication and
admissibility: the pictorialtestimony theory and the silent witness theory.27 The pictorialtestimony theory falls under Rule 901(b)(1), which
permits authentication of evidence by testimony that a matter is what
it is claimed to be. 28 Under the pictorial testimony theory, a photograph or videotape is merely illustrative of a witness' testimony. 29
Thus, the admissibility of photographic evidence is predicated on a
witness' ability to testify that the depicted scene accurately reflects the
events he witnessed.3 °
Authentication of photographic evidence under the silent witness
theory falls under Rule 901(b)(9), testimony as to the accuracy or process of a system.3 1 The silent witness theory is applied when no witness
observed the recorded events or can testify about the actions and
scenes recorded. 32 Such a situation typically arises when recordings
22. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at xxv-xxvi.
23. 868 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc).
24. See id. at 786.
25. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam).
26. Videotapes are considered the same as photographs for purposes of evidentiary admission. Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 321 (citing TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 1001(2)).
27. Pictorialtestimony theory is also referred to as pictorialcommunication theory.
See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE, § 5.02[1][a]-[c] (1996);
Madison, supra note 13, at 709-11.
28. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(b)(1).
29. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at IX-9. "The pictorial testimony theory treats
photographic evidence as a graphic illustration of a witness' testimony." Madison,
supra note 13, at 709.
30. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at IX-9.
31. See TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(b)(9).
32. See JOSEPH, supra note 27, § 5.02[1][b]; United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639.
(5th Cir. 1976). "Unlike the pictorialtestimony theory, the silent witness theory does
not require witness authentication because the photographic evidence is treated as
self-authenticating." Madison, supra note 13, at 710 (emphasis added). In People v.
Bowley, 382 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1963), the California Supreme Court explained that courts
would be forced to exclude a large class of photographic evidence absent the silent
witness theory because no witness is available to testify as to the authenticity of the
evidence. "There is no reason why a photograph or film, like an X-ray, may not, in a
proper case, be probative in itself. To hold otherwise would illogically limit the use of
a device whose memory is without question more accurate and reliable than that of a
human witness." Id. at 595.
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are made by privately owned surveillance cameras,33 such as those
used in banks and ATM machines. Since no witness can testify as to
the accuracy or the authenticity of the scenes recorded, most courts
only require that the evidence be reasonably authenticated under the
circumstances. Thus, under the silent witness theory, a photograph
or videotape is considered substantive evidence and not merely illustrative of a witness' testimony. 5
Both the pictorialtestimony theory and the silent witness theory underlie admissibility of videotape evidence in Texas.3 6 Therefore, the
Kephart court required that either a sponsoring witness with knowledge must testify under the pictorial testimony theory of Rule 901
(b)(1), or that the Edwards test, encompassed in the silent witness theory, must be satisfied under Rule 901(b)(9).37
II.

APPLICATION OF TEXAS RULE OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
KEPHART V. STATE

901

IN

In Kephart v. State,38 a woman convicted of possessing less than
twenty-eight ounces of cocaine challenged whether a videotape produced by third parties and introduced during the testimony of a witness with no personal knowledge of the events depicted was
sufficiently authenticated to justify its admission to the jury.39 During
the trial, the State introduced a videotape removed from a camera
that police discovered in a drug-related search of a hotel room rented
by the defendant's friends, Manuel Conde and Carole King. 40 The
local authorities viewed the videotape and identified the defendant,
Kephart, and her family.41 The tape depicted:
[V]arious scenes in the Appellant's home, interrupted by pauses in
the tape. On the tape, Appellant initially appears sober, then progressively under the influence of alcohol or narcotics, until she is
seen on the tape at a table, engaged in conversation with Conde.
On the table in the video is a white substance and a baggie with
33. See United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1976).
34. See JOSEPH, supra note 27, § 5.02[1][b]. See generally United States v. Taylor,
530 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a motion picture taken by a bank surveillance camera after a robber locked the bank personnel in a vault was admissible despite its inability to be authenticated by eyewitness testimony); United States v.
Pageau, 526 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that a videotape recording of a
prison assault was admissible, despite its inability to be authenticated by eyewitness
testimony of prison officials).
35. See Madison, supra note 13, at 710-11. Under the silent witness theory, a "photograph constitutes substantive evidence of a material issue independent of any testimony." Id. at 711.
36. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at IX-9.
37. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322.
38. 875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam).
39. See id. at 319-23.
40. See id. at 320.
41. See id.
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what appears to be marijuana, and their conversation is audible on
the tape.42
At trial, the videotape was introduced during the testimony of Officer
Flores, who admitted he had no personal knowledge of when or where
the tape was created.43 Officer Flores also could not state whether
the tape depicted the interior of Kephart's home, but could only affirm the tape was seized from Conde and King and that Kephart was
depicted on the tape." However, Kephart testified at trial that the
video was made in her home.45 Further, Kephart admitted to the
sheriff that "Conde was an old friend of hers and that he and King
stayed at her house on the night of October the twelfth [and] ...that

Conde, King, and [her]
husband were smoking marijuana and using
46
cocaine that night.
Interpreting the authenticity requirements of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901 as it applies to a third-party videotape, created a
case of first impression.4 The trial court held the videotape was admissible, 48 and the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed.4 9 However, Kephart appealed, contending the State failed to satisfy Rule
901's authenticity test.5
The Court of Criminal Appeals began its analysis of Rule 901 by
stating its authentication requirements are consistent with pre-rules
case law.5 The Court held Rule 901's applicability is not limited to
evidence obtained through police surveillance. 5 z The Court stated,
"[I]t is clear that our pre-rules caselaw regarding authentication of
videotapes required that either the Edwards test be satisfied
or a
53
sponsoring witness have knowledge of the scene depicted.
The Kephart court concluded that since Officer Flores did not have
personal knowledge of when and where the tape was made, "he could
not also state that the tape accurately represented the actual scene or
event at the time it occurred. '5 4 Therefore, the court reversed the
decision to admit the videotape, holding the State failed to properly
authenticate the videotape. 5
42. Id.

43. See id. at 322.
44. See id. at 320-22.
45. Kephart v. State, 888 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993), rev'd,
875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam). This testimony was not noted in
the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 827.
See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322.
See id. at 320.
See id.
See id. at 319.
See id. at 322.
See id. at 321.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 322-23.
See id. at 323. The court remanded the case for a harm analysis. See id.
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III. A CRITIQUE OF THE KEPHART COURT'S ANALYSIS
A.

The Text of Rule 901 Allows for Authentication by Means Other
Than a Sponsoring Witness

Rule 901(b) clearly states, "[b]y way of illustration only, and not by
way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or
' 56
identification conforming with the requirements of this rule.
Thereafter, Rule
901 lists nine illustrative examples of
57
authentication.
To authenticate evidence under Rule 901, a witness with knowledge
58
must offer "[tiestimony that the matter is what it is claimed to be."
Likewise, the Kephart court concluded, "Rule 901(b) allows for authentication to be accomplished by the testimony of any witness who
has personal knowledge that the particular item accurately represents
the scene or event it purports to portray." 59 However, the Kephart
court then took the fallacious position that a videotape must be authenticated by a witness with personal knowledge or meet substantially similar requirements in order to be admissible. 6° The Kephart
court failed to recognize that all Rule 901(b) illustrations are expressly
non-limiting.6 1
While Rule 901 permits a videotape to be authenticated by testimony of a witness with personal knowledge, this authentication
method is not exclusive.6 2 In fact, a videotape may be authenticated
under Rule 901(b) through "voice identification,'' "distinctive characteristics and the like," and testimony as to the "accuracy of a process or system. ' 65 Consequently, the Kephart court interpreted a Rule
901 illustration to be a limiting requirement.
56. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(b) (emphasis added).

57. The first authentication technique or illustrative example listed under Rule
901 is testimony of a witness with knowledge. Thereafter, the list includes: nonexpert
opinion on handwriting; comparison by trier or expert witness; distinctive characteristics and the like; voice identification; telephone conversations; public records and reports; ancient documents or data compilation; process or systems; and methods
provided by statute or rule. See TEx. R. CRIM. EvID. 901(b).
58. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(b)(1).
59. Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 321.
60. See id. at 322.
61. See TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 901(b).
62. See id.
63. TEX. R. ClM.EVID. 901(b)(5). See Allen v. State, 849 S.W.2d 838, 841-42
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. refd) (audio tape was authenticated by
law enforcement agent's testimony that the defendant's voice was recorded on the
tape); Hall v. State, 829 S.W.2d 407, 408-09 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no pet.) (videotape was authenticated by police officer who identified the voices on the recording);
Hinote v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Int'l Union, Local 4-23, 777 S.W.2d 134, 147 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (voices on audio tape identified by a
security guard who was a participant in the recorded conversation).
64. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(b)(4).
65. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(b)(9). See Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 276 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1988) (cassette tape recording copied from large reel-to-reel machine);
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Rule 901 is an Adoption of FederalRule 901 and Should be
Interpreted Similarly

Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 901 is an adoption of Federal Rule
of Evidence 901.66 In Cole v. State,6 7 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals declared that the "Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence ... are
patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence, and cases interpreting
federal rules should be consulted for guidance as to their scope and
applicability unless the Texas rule clearly departs from its federal
counterpart. ' 68 However, federal courts have differed substantially
from the Kephart court in their interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 901.
For example, in United States v. Stearns,69 a defendant was convicted of theft and transporting stolen property in interstate and foreign commerce. 70 At trial, the government introduced five
photographs of a stolen sailboat whose owners were never found.7 '
The photographs were taken by the defendant and revealed his sailboat appearing alongside the stolen vessel.72
Although there was little direct testimony introduced to establish
the technical accuracy of the photographs, the court held since the
photographs were in the possession of the defendant's friends and
since no evidence suggested government tampering, testimony concerning the technical accuracy of the photographs was unnecessary to
establish a foundation for admitting the photographs into evidence.73
"Even if direct testimony as to foundation matters is absent, however,
the contents of a photograph itself, together with such other circumstantial or indirect evidence as bears upon the issue, may serve to explain and authenticate a photograph sufficiently to justify its
admission into evidence. ' 74 Thus, the content of the photographs, in
concert with other circumstantial evidence which illustrated the times
the boats could have left the harbor, aided in their authentication.75
Although the Stearns trial took place before the present Federal
Rules of Evidence were in effect, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
relied upon the newly adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and the
Brooks v. State, 833 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd) (defendant's voice on tape identified by the 911 police dispatcher).
66. See Cole v. State, 839 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); Harris v.
State, 846 S.W.2d 960 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1993, pet. ref d).
67. 839 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).
68. Id. at 801.
69. 550 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir. 1977).
70. See id. at 1168.
71. See id. at 1169.
72. See id. at 1169-70.
73. See id. at 1170-71.

74. Id. at 1171.
75. See id. at 1171-72.
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Advisory Committee notes for guidance on authentication issues.76
The court ruled the testimony was insufficient to establish the photographs' authenticity when the trial court admitted them into evidence.77 Further, the court held the photographs should have been
conditionally admitted or admitted only once sufficient evidence of
their authenticity had been produced. 7 However, the court ruled that
because the government produced sufficient authentication evidence
before the close of the prosecution's case, the timing of the photograph's admission constituted harmless error.7 9
Surprisingly, the Kephart court cites Stearns as being in accord with
its decision,8" despite the fact that in Stearns "[n]o witness testified
explicitly, during the Government's case in chief, where or when the
pictures were taken or what they represented."" In fact, the Stearns
court permitted the government to prove when and where the photographs were taken through testimony and items shown in the photographs themselves. 82
Similarly, in Kephart, the videotapes illustrated a connection existed
between the defendant and the illegal substances,. 3 just as the photographs connected the defendant in Stearns to the stolen sailboat.' In
both Kephart opinions, the record states that Kephart made a written
statement to police revealing that the people in the videotape were at
her house on the night in question and were using a white powder and
smoking marihuana.85 However, as recorded only in the San Antonio
Court of Appeals opinion, Kephart also testified at trial that the videotape was made in her home. 6 The San Antonio Court of Appeals record likewise included the testimony of King, who stated that Conde
brought a clear bag of cocaine to Kephart's home on October twelfth
87
and that Kephart smoked crack cocaine in her home that evening.
Neither of these two facts were mentioned in the Court of Appeals
opinion. Further, Officer Flores testified the tape was taken directly
from a camera in the possession of Conde and King. 8 Thus,
Kephart's own statements, taken together with King's testimony and
76. See id.at 1170 & n.1.
77. See id.at 1172.

78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See Kephart v. State, 875 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam).
81. Stearns, 550 F.2d at 1171.

82. See id. The Stems court determined "that the photograph by itself establishes
a necessary element of its authenticity." Id.
83. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322.
84. See Stearns, 550 F.2d at 1171.
85. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 320; Kephart v. State, 888 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993), rev'd, 875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per

curiam).
86. See Kephart, 888 S.W.2d at 829.

87. See id.at 828.
88. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322.
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Officer Flores' testimony regarding subsequent seizure of the videotape in the possession of Kephart's friends, would seem sufficient for a
reasonable juror to find the videotape was what the State claimed it to
be.
The Kephart court misapplied Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence
901's authentication requirements, and thus limited the admissibility
of third-party or self-made videotape evidence into criminal trials.
The Kephart court erroneously interpreted Rule 901 as requiring videotapes to be authenticated by a sponsoring witness with knowledge of
the scene depicted or that essentially the Edwards test must be
satisfied.
The Kephart court ignored the consistency between King's and
Kephart's indirect testimony regarding the scenes and sounds recorded on the videotape. Instead, the Kephart court placed the complete burden of authentication upon one witness, Officer Flores, 89
stating, "time was a critical element under these facts.., since there
was no real way to tell from Flores' testimony when the tape was
made, more was needed to place the tape in the correct time frame." 90
However, given Kephart's and King's prior testimony as to the time
and place of the events recorded on the videotape, this statement is
dissimilar to the Stearns court's conclusion: that the government need
not present a witness with actual knowledge to prove the timing of a
photograph's authenticity, but instead, may utilize indirect evidence
and circumstantial testimony. 91
Concededly, it may have been preferable for the prosecution in
Kephart to introduce the videotape during King's testimony because
she was a witness with personal knowledge of the scenes depicted,
however, Rule 901 did not require the prosecution to do so. Although
King was an accomplice,' and "[a] conviction cannot be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence
tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed,"'9 3 the
Court of Appeals held the videotape corroborated King's testimony. '
89. See id.
90. Id. at 323 n.9.
91. See Steams v. United States, 550 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977).
92. See Kephart v. State, 888 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993),
rev'd, 875 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam).
93. Id. (quoting TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 3814 (Vernon 1979)).
94. See Kephart, 888 S.W.2d at 829. See also Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801, 807
(Tex. Grim. App. 1983) (en banc) ("All the facts and circumstances in evidence may
be looked to as furnishing the corroboration necessary [for accomplice testimony].");
Carrillo v. State, 566 S.W.2d 902, 908 (Tex. Grim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (affirming
that to establish corroboration of accomplice testimony, evidence need only make an
accomplice's testimony more likely than not to be true); Utsey v. State, 921 S.W.2d
451, 454 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, 1996, pet. ref'd) (ruling that accomplice testimony
may be corroborated by either direct or circumstantial evidence, such that bus tickets
purchased by the defendant were admissible and supported the accomplice's testimony by showing the circumstantial relationship of the parties to the scene and to the
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Further, there is no indication in Rule 901 that the burden of authentication must be placed solely on one sponsoring witness. In fact,
Officer Flores' testimony, taken together with King's testimony and
Kephart's own admissions, would seem to prove the videotape was
what the state claimed it to be. Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal
Appeals excluded the videotape evidence solely because the testifying
witness lacked personal knowledge. 95 Unlike the Stearns court, the
Kephart court failed to address whether sufficient circumstantial evidence was introduced during the trial to justify admission of the videotape. Thus, the Kephart holding fails to comport with the reasoning in
Stearns, that a photograph may be authenticated by its content, in concert with other circumstantial evidence. 96
The Kephart holding likewise conflicts with the holding in United
States v. Rembert.97 The Rembert court found automatic teller
machine ("ATM") videotape photographs were sufficiently authenticated by circumstantial testimony. In Rembert, a defendant was accused of robbing two victims of their ATM personal identification
numbers, and using the numbers to withdraw money from their accounts. 99 One ATM recorded a photographic videotape of the defendant withdrawing money.'0° When the videotape was entered as
evidence against him at trial, the defendant appealed the admission,
arguing the videotape was not authenticated under either the silent
witness theory or the pictorial testimony theory.''
Notably, the court in Rembert agreed with Rembert's contention
that the evidence did not meet the standards of either the pictorial
testimony theory or the silent witness theory, as adopted in Federal
Rule of Evidence 901.102 However, the court stated the methods for
authentication described under Rule 901 are "'[b]y way of illustration
only."' 03 Commenting that "the uses of photography have not stood
still and neither should the law,"" ° the court stated that authentication under Rule 901 merely requires "that 'the proponent of documentary evidence make a showing sufficient to permit a reasonable
juror to find that the evidence is what its proponent claims."' 05 The
court found the ATM videotape photographs were sufficiently authencontraband); Hill v. State, 666 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1983, no pet.) ("It is not necessary that the corroboration [of accomplice testimony]
directly link the accused to the crime or is sufficient in itself to establish guilt.").
95. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 322-23.
96. See Stearns, 550 F.2d at 1171.
97. 863 F.2d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 1026-28.
See id. at 1025.
See id.
See id. at 1026.

See id.
Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 901(b)).
Id. at 1027.
Id. (quoting United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
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ticated by circumstantial testimony from the two victims and a bank
supervisor, despite the supervisor's lack of personal knowledge of the
event, the reliability of the camera, the process by which 10the
ATM
6
recorded events, and the quality of the machine's product.
Clearly, the Rembert evidence would be excluded under the
Kephart court's interpretation of Rule 901's requirements - that
either a sponsoring witness must have knowledge of the scene depicted or that the Edwards test must be satisfied.' 0 7 However, the
federal courts in Stearns and Rembert interpreted Rule 901's requirements differently than did the Kephart court. Thus, since federal
courts allow authentication of videotape evidence through use of circumstantial evidence or indirect testimony and since the Texas Rules
of Criminal Evidence are based on the Federal Rules of Evidence,
they should be interpreted similarly.
C.

The Silent Witness Theory and The Pictorial Testimony Theory
are Categorizationsof Evidence Into Which Self-Created or
Third-Party Tapes May Not Fit
The inherent problem with the Kephart court's analysis is that recorded video or audio tape evidence, introduced in a criminal trial, is
normally produced by law enforcement agencies or under some similar type of formalized surveillance procedure. When the State creates
a surveillance videotape in consideration of litigation, it is, in effect,
building a case with an intent to prosecute. Thus, a prosecution utilizing a surveillance videotape will be based, in part, on the actions or
statements made by the defendant on tape. Consequently, when state
officials produce a videotape for the purpose of prosecution, the burden of proving its authenticity is logically placed squarely upon the
shoulders of its creator or proponent. Further, the requirement that a
witness with knowledge must testify as to a tape's authenticity under
the pictorial testimony theory is easily satisfied in police surveillance
cases. Officers in charge of the surveillance or authorities making the
recordings will usually be available to testify as to the recording's accuracy, or at least as to the type of equipment and procedures used to
create the tape and its subsequent chain of custody.
In contrast, a formalized, private surveillance often produces a
videotape without an actual witness to the events recorded. For example, cameras in automatic teller machines, parking lots, and other
commonly monitored private areas record events over time that no
witness may have observed. However, under the silent witness theory,
a videotape may be authenticated by testimony focusing on the workings of the recorder and upon the videotape's chain of custody,' 0 8
106. See id. at 1026-28.
107. See Kephart v. State, 875 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (per curiam).
108. See United States v. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 1976); JOSEPH, supra
note 27, § 5.02[b].
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which must be elicited from individuals connected with the surveillance procedure." 9
Therefore, the pictorialtestimony and silent witness theories provide
methods to authenticate videotape evidence created under two commonly occurring circumstances: police sting operations and private
business surveillance. Generally, evidence recorded in this manner is
produced in consideration of litigation. Thus, it is logical to require
that a witness with knowledge must testify as to the accuracy of the
scenes depicted or as to the accuracy of the process used to create a
videotape, because such requirements ensure that recordings are not
falsified to gain an advantage in the courtroom.
However, the pictorialtestimony theory and the silent witness theory
were not developed in relation to home-produced videotapes. Further, the Edwards test was developed in relation to videotape evidence recorded by law enforcement agencies in contemplation of
litigation. While the Kephart court correctly refused to limit Rule
901's application solely to tapes created by law enforcement, it erroneously required a third-party tape to be authenticated the same as a law
enforcement videotape. 110 Therefore, under the Kephart court's interpretation of Rule 901, many third-party and self-made videotapes will
likely be excluded from evidence because the only person who is capable of testifying as to the accuracy of the scenes depicted or as to the
accuracy of the taping process may be the defendant.
Two simple hypotheticals illustrate the flaws in the Kephart court's
analysis. First, suppose a defendant creates a videotape of himself
sexually assaulting a kidnap victim. The victim is subsequently murdered, but little direct physical evidence exists connecting the murderer with the victim or the crime. If the defendant's videotape is
legally seized by the authorities, it will be excluded from evidence
under the Kephart court's reasoning since it is highly unlikely that the
defendant will testify as to the accuracy of the scenes depicted or as to
the accuracy of the process used to create the videotape.
Alternatively, imagine a homeowner whose home security video
camera records his murder. The murderer and his actions are clearly
depicted on the videotape. However, with no sponsoring witness or
someone to testify as to the accuracy of the process used to create the
videotape, the tape will be excluded from evidence under the Kephart
rule. In conjunction with circumstantial evidence, these video recordings could be pivotal substantive evidence.
Both these hypothetical videotapes would be excluded under the
Kephart court's present interpretation of Rule 901's authentication
requirements. Since authentication of evidence is clearly fact-dependent, it seems illogical to require that a large class of evidence be ex109. See WENDORF, supra note 13, at IX-9.
110. See Kephart, 875 S.W.2d at 321-22.
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cluded from the trier of fact when it may be authenticated by indirect
or circumstantial means."'
D. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Held Circumstantial
Evidence May Be Used to Authenticate Audio Recordings
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals holds circumstantial evidence
may be used to establish an audio tape recording's authenticity. In
Wallace v. State,1 12 the court permitted inclusion of an audio tape
made by a police informant as evidence against Wallace, who was convicted of capital murder." 3 Wallace hired an accomplice-informant to
murder his wife and burn down their home to hide evidence of the
murder. 1 4 When the accomplice-informant was arrested for arson, he
agreed to carry a recording device into a meeting with Wallace to engage Wallace in a conversation about the
arson, the murder, and the
15
payment for burning down the house."
Although the audio tape was introduced without the direct testimony of the accomplice-informant, the voices on the audio tape were
identified by three other witnesses." 6 Thus, the audio tape was not
authenticated by the testimony of a witness with knowledge. 117 Nevertheless, the court stated that although the Rules of Criminal Evidence were not in effect at the time of the trial, "Rule 901 would
arguably allow circumstantial evidence to be used to authenticate audio recordings." 1 8 Thus, the court held that "circumstantial evidence,
rather than testimony of a contemporaneous witness, may be used to
satisfy the predicate for admission of sound recordings.""' 9
Under the logic of Wallace, the Kephart court's requirement that a
videotape recording with audio must be authenticated by a witness
with personal knowledge is clearly erroneous. To require simple audio recordings to be authenticated differently than sound recordings
with an image defies logic. Both types of recordings are usually made
on magnetized tape and are equally subject to manipulation. In addition, the combination of audio and video should provide a greater indicia of reliability and authenticity to a recording than would audio
111. See State v. Kistle, 297 S.E.2d 626 (N.C. App. 1982) (admitting into evidence
photographs of the defendant taking indecent liberties with a child based upon film
processor's testimony that he processed photographs and another witness' testimony
that defendant delivered undeveloped film for processing).
112. 782 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
113. See id. at 858-59.

114. See id. at 855.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 858.

117. See id.
118. IdL at 856-57 n.6.
119. Id. at 858.
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alone.12 ° Consequently, insufficient reason exists to justify requiring a
different, much less a heightened, authentication standard for recordings with audio and video images than for audio tape alone.
IV.

Two PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR AUTHENTICATION OF
VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE

A. An Objective Totality of the Circumstances Standard
The word authentication,used in Rule 901, suggests the Rule's internalized view that evidence is assumed inadmissible unless some predicate can be established.' 21 The pictorial testimony theory and the
silent witness theory were developed by courts to determine if a predicate for admissibility has been established for videotape evidence produced by law enforcement agencies or private business surveillance.
Under the pictorialtestimony theory, a tape is deemed introduced for
illustrative effect only.' 22 The silent witness theory permits a tape to be
deemed substantive evidence in and of itself.' 23 However, tapes introduced merely for illustrative effect are often given substantive effect. 124 Moreover, the difference between illustrative and 25substantive
evidence is often so small as to be practically irrelevant.
Texas Rule of Evidence 104(b) provides "when the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition."'1 26 As applied to Kephart, the videotape's relevancy depended upon fulfillment
of the condition that it was what the prosecution said it was. To establish this condition, Rule 901 requires "evidence sufficient to support27 a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."'
The correct determination of both the Stearns and Rembert courts
was that authentication is a prerequisite to admission of a videotape,
and that authentication of a videotape may be accomplished by direct
testimony, indirect testimony, or by other means.' 2 s The Rembert
court stated the admissibility standard: "'the proponent of documentary evidence [must] make a showing sufficient to permit a reasonable
120. See Roy v. State, 608 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (holding since

videotapes have pictures and sound, this dual aspect conveys a greater indicia of reliability than either alone).
121. See Richard D. Friedman, Refining Conditional Probative Value, 94 MICH. L.
REv.457, 458 (1995).

122. See

JOSEPH,

supra note 27, § 5.02(1)(c).

123. See id.

124. See id.
125. See id.
126. TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 104(b).

127. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 901(a).
128. See United States v. Steams, 550 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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juror to find that the evidence is what its proponent claims. ' "1 2 9
Therefore, despite the fact that a videotape may not fit into a common
category or theory under Rule 901, it may be authenticated by a sufficient showing that the tape is what its proponent claims it to be. Thus,
strict reliance upon the pictorial testimony theory or the silent witness
theory is unnecessary. 130 Both testimony of a witness with knowledge
or testimony as to the reliability of a process are merely examples of
sufficient authentication under Rule 901.
Therefore, to satisfy Rule 901's authentication requirements, a reasonable juror should be able to determine from the totality of the circumstances whether a tape is authentic. This logical approach
requires no strict reliance upon special theories of admissibility.
Rather, it only requires that if the tape cannot satisfy an objective test
of reasonableauthenticationunder the circumstances,it will be denied
admission. Further, if a tape is conditionally admitted, a jury may be
instructed to disregard it if a proponent fails to introduce evidence
sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of a condition.
Under an objective test, a videotape's admissibility into evidence
must necessarily depend upon the circumstances under which the
videotape was created. When the State creates a videotape in anticipation of prosecution, a witness is likely to be available to testify.
Thus, it is reasonable to require an authenticating witness in the case
of police recorded tapes. Alternatively, it may not be reasonable
under the circumstances for the State to fail to produce an authenticating witness.
In the case of videotape produced in private business surveillance,
testimony should be given, if available, of the methods used to create
a videotape and its chain of custody. Having gone through the effort
and expense to create business surveillance tapes, it may be reasonable to require someone to testify as to the process used. Alternatively, it may not be reasonable for private business to fail to produce
testimony regarding the process used to create a tape or its chain of
custody.
However, in the case of self-made or third-party videotapes, a witness is often unavailable to testify. Thus, it is reasonable that a videotape's proponent be permitted to authenticate it through
circumstantial or indirect evidence,' 3 ' as allowed under Rule 901.
129. Rembert, 863 F.2d at 1027 (quoting United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325,

1330 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
130. See JOSEPH, supra note 27, § 5.02[1][c].
131. See generally Pierre R. Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO. L. REV.
235 (1965). In fact, some commentators have advocated permitting a jury to weigh
and authenticate commonplace circumstantial or indirect evidence when it pertains to
film and business records without a preliminary authentication determination by a
judge because the matter goes to the weight, not to the admissibility of the evidence.
See James J. Hippard, Sr., Article X: Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photo-

graphs, in

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK,
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In applying an objective totality of the circumstances standard for
authentication of videotape evidence to Kephart, the facts would seem
sufficient to establish the videotape's authenticity under Texas Rule of
Criminal Evidence 901. In Kephart, the State presented Kephart's
friend, King, who testified that Kephart acted illegally on the night in
question. Kephart herself testified as to the time and place of the
scene depicted in the videotape, as well as to the acts fact that the
videotape was made in her home. However, the court ignored the
consistency between Kephart's and King's statements. Further, Officer Flores testified the videotape was removed from a camera in the
possession of Kephart's friends, Conde and King, and testified to the
videotape's subsequent chain of custody. Therefore, in totality, the
circumstantial evidence presented in Kephart seems sufficient for a
reasonable juror to conclude the videotape was what the State
claimed it to be.
B. No Requirement for Separate Evidence Authenticating Proffered
Evidence
A more sweeping solution may be to amend the language of both
Federal Rule of Evidence 901 and Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence
901 to concretely define their authentication requirements in a manner more consistent with other evidentiary rules and standards. Professor Richard D. Freidman proposes that there be no federal
authentication requirement that separate evidence authenticate proffered evidence. 13 His proposed Rule 901 language would read, in
part: "Authentication or identification shall be required as a condition precedent to admissibility if and only if ...(1) 'there is substantial
doubt that the proffered evidence is what its proponent claims, and (2)
the proponent of the evidence is substantially better able than the opponent to produce evidence bearing on that question.'''133 This may
provide a logical structure and provide internal consistency between
the underlying requirements of Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 402
and 403: that all relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative
value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.)"
However, this solution removes the necessity for authentication unless there is substantial doubt as to the authenticity of the evidence
and the proponent is in a better position to present evidence on authenticity. 35 This would suggest the burden of proof is shifted to the
Hous. L. REV. 1093, 1106 (Cathleen C. Herasimchuk ed., 2d ed. 1993). Further,
"[c]ourts often have held that uncertainty over photographic evidence is relevant to
the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility." Madison, supra note 13, at
715.
132. See Freidman, supra note 121, at 458.
133. Id. at 464 (quoting Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV. 439, 466 (1994).
134. See TEX. R. CRiM. EVID. 402, 403 (paralleling FED. R. EvID. 402, 403).
135. See Friedman, supra note 121, at 464.
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opponent of evidence and thus, prior to admission of evidence, an opponent must show that a substantial doubt exists as to a videotape's
authenticity. Given the ease of video manipulation, some commentators may propose a presumption that video evidence be assumed to
create substantial doubt. Indeed, it may also be logical to require authentication of litigation-created tapes since the creator/proponent is
usually substantially better able than the opponent to produce evidence bearing on that question.
Alternatively, in the case of self-made or third-party videotape recorded without a sponsoring witness and not in contemplation of litigation, this proposed rule would place the burden of showing
substantial doubt exists about a videotape's authenticity upon the opponent of evidence. In any event, a textual modification of the authentication requirements of both Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence
901 and Federal Rule of Evidence 901 may be necessary to clarify the
rule's application to third-party or self-made video evidence.
CONCLUSION

The Rembert court stated, "[Tihe role of photography in technology
and society at large is a changing one, and the courts must change with
it."' 36 Unfortunately, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals chose not
to change. Authentication of videotape evidence is a fact-dependent
area. Theories such as the silent witness theory and the pictorialtestimony theory are only recognitions that there are recurring fact patterns that can be categorized, such as those in prosecutions involving
videotapes recorded by law enforcement agencies or private business
surveillance. Proper use of these authentication theories is therefore
predicated upon facts that fit those categories. However, self-made
and third-party created videotapes often do not fit into these categorizations. Nevertheless, third-party or self-made videotape evidence
should not be automatically excluded because it fails to fall in either
theoretical evidentiary category.
To prevent this automatic exclusion, it seems the most promising
solution is to apply the objective totality of the circumstances test proposed in this comment. Requiring authentication to depend on the
circumstances under which a tape is created is the only method that
balances the jury's need to see all relevant evidence with the dangers
of allowing manipulated videotape to influence the trier of fact.
Kephart presented a set of circumstances illustrating the need to allow indirect testimony to authenticate videotape evidence. Instead,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals chose a path that will result in
the unnecessary exclusion of relevant evidence without regard to any
alternative means available for authentication. Hopefully, when
136. United States v. Rembert, 863 F.2d 1023, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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presented with a similar question in the near future, the court will
modernize its position.
Stephen Jeffrey Chapman

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

19

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 3 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 5

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol3/iss1/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V3.I1.3

20

